The (almost really) Complete Works of Lewis Carroll

In the first six volumes of this eagerly awaited work Mr. Gladstone leads up to his subject. Vols. i. to iii. consist of prefatory matter, in which the indefatigable author explains the lines on which he proposes to work, and in vols. iv. to vi. he revises. The treatise, which, when it is completed, will form a handsome library in itself, is dedicated to the late Gabriel Harvey, “as a slight token of admiration for a writer whose MSS. broke the wheels of a carrier’s cart.” To judge the book at present would be manifestly unfair; but we cannot think these six introductory volumes unworthy of their author’s reputation.

Mr. Gladstone defines logic as “the art of explaining that it is all right,” and he then hastens to point out (pp. 42–118, vol. i.) the inadvisability of using definitions at all. “For the meaning of a word or term,” continues our author, “is that which we think about when we use another word or term; and no word or term has the same signification (or connotation) in one proposition that it has in another.” Mr. Gladstone cites numerous examples. “When I use the word ‘retire,’” he says, “in reference to a Government’s policy, I may mean ‘annex.’” Again, “The term ‘atrocities,’ when applied to certain persons and certain regions, connotes blood-guiltiness; applied to others it may imply, if it has any connotation at all, butchery for the ultimate advantage of the butchered.”

Want of space prevents us dwelling at length on Mr. Gladstone’s second volume, which is, perhaps, the most suggestive of the series, so far as it has gone. It may be briefly described as a caution against taking vol. i. too literally; “for all written or spoken statements must be considered in their relation to current events.” Of the conversion of propositions Mr. Gladstone says little (pp. 15–182, vol. iii.) at present, holding this part of his subject too important for treatment in introductory volumes. He, however, makes merry over so-called “limited conversion.” “Conversion," says Mr. Gladstone emphatically, “is unlimited;” and he adds, by way of caution to beginners, “it is well when you employ an affirmative proposition to explain that you use it in its negative sense.”

After a noble but somewhat discursive peroration, Mr. Gladstone briefly states his rules of the syllogism (pp. 312–407). It will surprise no one that these differ from the views on the subject held by Whately; for Mr. Gladstone’s work is sufficiently original to upset the old-fashioned Aristotelian theories of reasoning altogether. The new rules of the syllogism are five in number, and are stated in five sentences occupying two pages apiece. Each word is explained at length in brackets; but, with these reluctantly omitted (for the sake of brevity), the rules stand thus:—

(1) A syllogism must contain not less than four terms. “Three terms,” says our author, “sufficed for Aristotle and his contemporaries; but in these days of complexity we cannot do with less then four.” It is to be noted that Mr. Gladstone does not confine the syllogism to four terms. “Five,” he adds in an appendix, “are sometimes employed with effect; and it is worth remembering that by varying your connotations you really increase the number of your terms.” This is the example given:—

As Mr. Gladstone truly observes, “there seems something wrong about this syllogism when thus baldly expressed; but there can be no doubt of its validity when stated at proper length.” The author then proceeds to prove in a masterly dissertation (pp. 480–601) that the Conservatives are to blame for the imbroglio in Egypt.

A syllogism (says Rule 2) must similarly consist of not less than four propositions; “for plainly we can draw more deductions from four propositions than from three;” e. g.:—

“But there are some terms,” we learn from a foot-note, “apt to lead to confusion and ambiguity. This word ‘Gordon’ is one of them, and I would be glad to see it expunged from the language.”

Passing over Rule 3—which, “though you would hardly think it,” is only Rule 2 in disguise—we reach the fourth rule: If we are told a little about the terms in the premisses, we are entitled to infer a great deal more in the conclusion. The last rule is a beautiful exposition of the doctrine that “from two negative premisses anything can be inferred.” For example:—

Mr. Gladstone prefaces his remarks on the hypothetical syllogism with the truism that “we must first take for granted whatever we want to prove, and should always prove one thing by arguing about another.” And in another place he says, “Often an important premiss is not stated but merely conceived in the mind.” As thus:—

“The hidden premiss,” continues our author, “is extremely useful, and it is difficult to see how we could get on without it.” It is not, however, a subject on which Mr. Gladstone dwells very long.

Vols. iv. to vi. may be best regarded as a commentary on the preceding volumes. “I have laid down my plan of procedure,” Mr. Gladstone explains, “at considerable length and with great caution; for I have not yet absolutely determined what my plan of procedure is to be. If I have aywhere left a statement unguarded by a qualifying phrase, such error is owing to want of careful revision. Wherever my assertions are contradictory it must be understood that in the one I empress my own opinion, subject to explanations, and in the others the opinions of other persons. At the present stage of the work I cannot undertake to decide which are my opinions; but wherever a syllogism is given in Barbara it will be advisable to convert it at once into Camestres. This will leave my original statement unchallenged, besides affording wholesome exercise for the student, and the result, of course, will in all cases be the same.”

Mr. Gladstone’s sixth volume concludes in the middle of a most interesting chapter on “the suicidal policy of using one word when two will do as well.” “Every additional word,” argues the author eloquently, “is an additional loophole of escape; and, indeed, by a judicious blending of terms the logician can always unsay in one sentence what he said in the preceding one.”

We have frequently had occasion to question the utility of Mr. Gladstone’s services as a statesman, but it would be ungenerous to deny that there is much thought-compelling matter in his latest work. There is no sham about it, the author laying bare the working of his mind for the benefit of a generation soon, to soon, to come after him; and so honest a book is far on its way to being a great book. There is much in it that may fairly be called biographical. The Premier has been fortunate in his publishers, though cloth binding is perhaps desirable. The volumes are issued in stiff blue paper covers that do not seem unfamiliar, and the general get-up of the work is excellent. We notice a few misprints, but these will doubtless be corrected in the second edition; to the reviser we may suggest that sentences of more than one page in length are apt to confuse.